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Reasoning about belief and knowledge
The use of rational agents for modelling real world problems has both been heavily inves-
tigated and become well accepted, with BDI (Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions) Logic being
a widely used architecture to represent and reason about rational agency. However, in the
real world, we often have to deal with different levels of conﬁdence in the beliefs we hold,
desires we have, and intentions that we commit to. This paper extends our previous frame-
work that integrated qualitative levels of beliefs, desires, and intentions into BDI Logic. We
describe an expanded set of axioms and properties of the extended logic. We present a
modular structure for the semantics which involves a non-normal Kripke type semantics
that may be used for other agent systems. Further, we demonstrate the usefulness of our
framework with a scheduling task example.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction and motivation
As a way of representing and reasoning about complex real world problems in the ﬁeld of information and communi-
cation technologies, agent technologies are now well recognised [15] and in particular, BDI Logic is one of the most widely
studied formal languages for modelling rational agents. BDI Logic originated from the early work of Bratman [7], was chieﬂy
developed by Rao and Georgeff [18,19], and agent languages such as AgentSpeak [17], and architectures such as JASON [6,5]
and JACK [8] are based on it. The main goal of BDI agent frameworks is to model human-like reasoning by capturing the
mentalistic notions or attitudes of belief, desire, and intention. In the real world, these notions cannot be simply evaluated
in terms of true or false. We argue that, like humans, the agent must have an ability to reason with different levels of men-
talistic notions, such as strong belief, moderate belief, weak belief, disbelief, etc. These levels of an agent’s attitudes reﬂect
the degree of its conﬁdence about its beliefs, its desires, and its intentions and thereby allow more versatility in modelling
situations.
As a simple example, let us introduce the personal assistant software of an academic (Helen). Part of the duties of this
assistant software involves arranging Helen’s schedule of attending seminars, etc. The system receives email notiﬁcations of
seminars, meetings, etc., and using its database of Helen’s beliefs, desires, and intentions, it allocates a schedule for Helen.
Unfortunately, with standard BDI, there may be several seminars, meetings, or combinations of these occurring at the same
time that Helen desires to attend. The system is unable to decide which to assign without some method of differentiation.
We shall look further at this example later in this paper.
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mentalistic notions and therefore give that differentiation. That framework presented a common syntax and underlying
logic for the mentalistic notions, and was extended loosely from the multi-modal BDI logic of [19] with each grading or
level being a separate modality. It also introduced doxastic ignorance (an effective absence of real belief) as one of the belief
levels, and goal indifference (an absence of desire/intention) as one of the desire/intention levels. Also noted was a similarity
with the framework presented by Casali et al. in [9]. Like the framework in [3] and this paper, Casali introduces levels in all
the mentalistic notions of BDI, as well as, using numeric, possiblistic type functions in its semantics. However, the similarity
ends there. Casali’s framework uses multi-contexts with a different semantics for each of the mentalistic notions, though a
common underlying multi-valued Lukasiewicz logic is used. This tends to make it overly complex, unwieldy and somewhat
counter-intuitive. While there are nominally three modalities, they are more akin to possibility functions. Desires tend to
be combined arbitrarily with no deﬁned method for calculating the result. In this paper’s second section, we will extend
the basic framework syntax given in [3]. The logic’s levels will be extended from that previous paper, and explained with
the appropriate axioms and properties presented. The theory of having levels of belief will be ﬁrst explained and further
motivated. Some of the most obvious axioms and properties will be examined, including the KD45 axioms, which are
pertinent to belief. This will be followed by a discussion on goals (desire and intention) and how they are incorporated
into this same framework of levels. In Section 3 a general non-normal Kripke type semantics, which may be used for any
framework that uses levels of modality, is presented. The semantics of an agent, in particular a BDI agent, is presented
and then incorporated with the Kripke semantics into an overall system. The scheduling example with the academic Helen
begun earlier in the current section will be extended in Section 4 using this framework to show its versatility and give an
intuitive result. The paper is concluded in Section 5.
2. Framework syntax
The alphabet of this framework is the union of the following pairwise disjoint sets of symbols: a non-empty countable
set P of atomic propositions; the set {∧, ∨, →, ¬} of connectives; the set of brackets {(, [, ), ]}; and a set of modalities
MOD.
MOD is the Cartesian product of the set of identiﬁers of the mentalistic attitudes {B, D, I} and the set of Levels, where
Levels = {A,U1,U2, . . . ,Un,E, I,Wn,Wn−1, . . . ,W1,D}. Therefore MOD will be made up of such modalities as BA, DU2, and II.
The fact the D and I are elements in both the attitudes and the Levels should not cause confusion as their positioning in the
modality will denote which they are. For more explanation on the meanings of the various modalities and levels, see the
next sub-section. The syntax of the language is as follows:
ϕ :: p|(BΦϕ)|(PΦϕ)|(¬ϕ)|(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)|(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)|(ϕ1 → ϕ2)
where ϕ ∈ L (L is the set of all formulae of the alphabet), p ∈ P , and Φ ∈ Levels. We write (ϕ1 ≡ ϕ2) to abbreviate
(ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2 → ϕ1).
2.1. Levels of belief
As intimated in the introduction, in realistic situations, agents may have shades of belief. Anyone familiar with Non-
monotonic Logic, in general, and Defeasible Logic, in particular [1,2,16], would recognise that there are situations where
something may be believed to be usually true (e.g. any random given bird is usually able to ﬂy), or conversely, believed
usually not true (or weakly believed). There may be situations where the level of belief matches the level of disbelief (i.e.
the agent doesn’t know what to believe). In [3], 5 levels of belief (and desire and intention) were presented. BA was the
mode of absolute belief, equivalent to the normal belief of Doxastic Logic, BU was ‘usual belief’, BI doxastic ignorance, BW
weak belief or ‘usually not’ believed, and BD signiﬁed disbelief. In the current work, the BU and BW levels are expanded to
n levels of each, with the value of n depending on the domain (e.g. for our scheduling example presented later, n is set at
5 making 14 levels in all). Previously, Doxastic Ignorance was deﬁned as including both indecisive belief and a lack of belief
[3]. We split this into two logical terms and modalities. Doxastic Ignorance is a term to denote something in which no belief
is held at all and is similar to the logic presented in [14], but differs in that Doxastic Ignorance naturally pertains to belief,
and not knowledge. Doxastic Equivalence is a term to denote equal evidence for and against a belief. A description of the
various levels of belief is now presented.
The belief levels we consider are deﬁned as follows.
• BAϕ means ϕ is believed absolutely and is the strongest belief level (e.g. “the sun will rise tomorrow”).
• BUiϕ means ϕ is usually believed true (e.g. ϕ is “the bus will be on time”) where i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} and the number of
levels n within BU is domain and application dependent. So, BU1ϕ means ϕ is believed slightly less than at BA level.
Then BU2ϕ means ϕ is believed slightly less than at BU1 and so on down to BUn which signiﬁes belief slightly more
than BE and perhaps BI.
• BEϕ means ϕ is equally believed and disbelieved, that is the agent has equal evidence for and against ϕ . We label it as
Doxastic Equivalence.
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• BWiϕ means ϕ is usually not believed, or only weakly believed, where the number of levels within BW will be the
same as within BU. BWi is the mirror opposite of BUi so that BWn is belief slightly less than Doxastic Equivalence with
BWn−1 slightly less than that and down to BW1 which is belief slightly more than total disbelief.
• BDϕ means ϕ is absolutely disbelieved (e.g. ϕ is “a comet will hit my house tonight”) and is the mirror of BA.
• Doxastic possibility (P) is the  (diamond) to belief’s  (box) (i.e. PΦϕ = ¬BΦ¬ϕ). Following Hintikka [12], the reading
of ϕ , where the interpretation of  is that of a particular type of belief, is “ϕ is consistent with what is believed”.
Thus, for example, PUiϕ means “ϕ is consistent with what is usually believed”.
A formula being the mirror of another can be explained by example as follows. BDϕ can be thought of as being equivalent
to BA¬ϕ . So, in plain speak, disbelief in ϕ is the same as belief (absolute) in ϕ not being true, and naturally the converse
is also true (BAϕ ≡ BD¬ϕ). This is reiterated and explained in more detail in Section 2.2. This leads to it being obvious that
there is a natural aﬃnity between the absolute belief level and the absolute disbelief level as well as between the levels of
usual belief (BUi) and those of usual disbelief (BWi). This suggests the ability to cut the levels down by approximately half
by eliminating BD and the BW levels. However, with only BA, the BU levels, BE, and BI, priority direction between levels
could alter depending on a formula’s sign. Therefore, all levels are retained here to simplify the reasoning using essentially
the positive form of formulae.
2.2. Belief axioms and properties
In this section we present belief axioms, and properties that follow from those axioms. Belief axiom numbering is
preﬁxed by “AB” and properties by “PB”. Let ϕ,ψ ∈ L, n ∈ Z+ , i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, and Φ,Ψ,Ω ∈ Levels.
BAϕ∨ BU1ϕ ∨ BU2ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BUnϕ ∨ BIϕ ∨ BEϕ ∨ BWnϕ ∨ BWn−1ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BW1ϕ ∨ BDϕ. (AB1)
At least one of the belief levels holds for each ϕ in L. Whatever formula is selected, it must be believed at some level of
belief, even if that level is only Doxastic Ignorance.
If Φ = Ψ, then BΦϕ → ¬BΨϕ. (AB2)
For each formula in L, at most one belief level holds.
If ϕ ≡ ψ, then BΦϕ ≡ BΦψ. (AB3)
Belief does not depend on the syntax of the formula.
BAϕ ≡ BD¬ϕ. (AB4)
BDϕ ≡ BA¬ϕ. (PB1)
For each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, BUiϕ ≡ BWi¬ϕ. (AB5)
For each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, BWiϕ ≡ BUi¬ϕ. (PB2)
The belief modalities BD and BWi are the mirror opposites of BA and BUi respectively. For example, say ϕ represents
the proposition the grass in my front yard is green, and the formula BAϕ is deemed true (ϕ is absolutely believed). Therefore
¬ϕ will mean ϕ is not true or effectively mean the grass in my front yard is NOT green and BD¬ϕ (disbelieve that the grass
in my front yard is not green) is consistent with our example belief in BAϕ . In fact, the two belief formulae are equivalent
as indicated in axiom AB4. This mirroring is the same with all the other levels except BE and BI (see AB6 and AB7 for the
axioms involving BE and BI). Therefore, if it is the case that the agent believes that almost always the said grass is green
(e.g. BU1ϕ ), this is equivalent to the same agent’s believing very weakly (or usually not) that it is not the case that this grass
is green (BW1¬ϕ). Naturally the property PB1 follows from AB4 and PB2 similarly follows from AB5.
BEϕ ≡ BE¬ϕ. (AB6)
BIϕ ≡ BI¬ϕ. (AB7)
If a formula ϕ is held in Doxastic Equivalence it is the case that the agent cannot decide between believing for or against ϕ
(perhaps due to equal evidence/belief for ϕ and ¬ϕ). If ϕ is held in Doxastic Ignorance it is the case that the agent has
no level of actual belief at all in ϕ (perhaps due to no knowledge about ϕ). It is therefore obvious that if ϕ is held in
Doxastic Equivalence or Doxastic Ignorance, then ¬ϕ must be similarly held in Doxastic Equivalence or Doxastic Ignorance
respectively.
BΠϕ → ¬BIϕ ∧ ¬BI¬ϕ(
where Π ∈ Levels− {I}). (PB3)
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negation, can be held in Doxastic Ignorance.
BIϕ → ¬BAϕ ∧ ¬BU1ϕ ∧ ¬BU2ϕ ∧ · · · ∧ ¬BUnϕ ∧ ¬BEϕ ∧
¬BE¬ϕ ∧ ¬BUn¬ϕ ∧ · · · ∧ ¬BU2¬ϕ ∧ ¬BU1¬ϕ ∧ ¬BA¬ϕ. (PB4)
Therefore, the reverse of PB3 is obviously true. If a formula is held in Doxastic Ignorance, it cannot be held in a level of
actual belief.
BIϕ → ¬BAϕ ∧ ¬BU1ϕ ∧ ¬BU2ϕ ∧ · · · ∧ ¬BUnϕ ∧ ¬BEϕ ∧
¬BE¬ϕ ∧ ¬BWnϕ ∧ · · · ∧ ¬BW2ϕ ∧ ¬BW1ϕ ∧ ¬BDϕ. (PB5)
PB5 follows from PB4, PB1 and PB2.
The following non-numbered deﬁnition will be formally generalised later.
Deﬁnition. PΦϕ = ¬BΦ¬ϕ and conversely, BΦϕ = ¬PΦ¬ϕ .
BIϕ ≡ ¬PIϕ. (PB6)
PB6 follows from AB7 and BI¬ϕ ≡ ¬PI¬¬ϕ ≡ ¬PIϕ .
Bearing in mind the relationship between the belief levels, let us look at the Doxastic Possibility of each of the belief
levels.
In the following property (PB7), the symbol (ΦM) is deﬁned as the mirror of the level Φ , that is,
AM = D, UMi = Wi, EM = E, IM = I, WMi = Ui, DM = A; where i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}.
PΦϕ ≡
∨[{BΨϕ: Ψ ∈ Levels} − {BΦMϕ}]. (PB7)
The property PB7 is deduced by expanding Deﬁnition 1 for any of the belief levels. For example, Doxastic Possibility for
absolute belief of a formula is, by deﬁnition, the negation of absolute belief of the negation of that formula. By PB1, this
is then equivalent to the negation of disbelief of the formula. So, if the result is not disbelief, it must be one of the other
levels of belief, and this is what is encapsulated in this property. As an example, the application of PB7 for the U1 level of
belief is as follows:
PU1ϕ ≡ (BAϕ ∨ BU1ϕ ∨ BU2ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BUnϕ ∨ BEϕ ∨ BIϕ ∨ BWnϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BW2ϕ ∨ BDϕ).
2.2.1. KD45 axioms
In multi-modal BDI logic, as well as in Doxastic Logic, belief has an axiom system which includes the axioms known
collectively as the KD45 system. K is a basic axiom of Kripke systems or possible world semantics and bears certain simi-
larities to omniscience as well as modus ponens. It is deﬁned as (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ →ψ) (“if it is necessary that the rule
ϕ implies ψ is true, then if it is necessary that ϕ is true, then this implies that it is necessary that ψ must be true”). D is
the axiom of seriality and is deﬁned as ϕ →ϕ (“if something is necessarily true, this implies that it is possibly true”).
Axiom 4 is the axiom of transitivity and importantly, is the axiom of positive introspection. It is deﬁned as ϕ → ϕ
(“if something is necessarily true, then it is necessary that it is necessarily true”). This is closely aligned with axiom 5 or
Euclidity, the axiom of negative introspection, which is deﬁned as ϕ → ϕ (“if something is possibly true, then it is
necessary that it is possibly true”). It has already been noted in the Introduction that the Kripke type semantics for this
logic is non-normal so some aspects of KD45 may not hold. Next we will look at what exactly does hold of KD45 for our
levels of belief.
It has been shown elsewhere [13], that the K axiom does not hold over modality gradings. An example of the K axiom
for the BD level of belief,
BD(ϕ → ψ) → (BDϕ → BDψ),
is that if we strongly disbelieve the rule if the sun is shining then it is raining, then it follows that if we disbelieve the sun
is shining, this implies that we disbelieve that it is raining. This is plainly counterintuitive and the other levels (except for
BA) have this problem to varying degrees. However, we present here axiom AB8, which we derived and altered from the K
axiom, and which makes much more sense.
BΦ(ϕ → ψ) → (BAϕ → BΦψ). (AB8)
AB8 can be more commonly written as
BAϕ ∧ BΦ(ϕ → ψ) → BΦψ.
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BΦϕ ∧ BA(ϕ → ψ) → BΦψ,
is not valid. It would be valid if ϕ ≡ ψ , but as is, the most accurate possible axiom for this conﬁguration would be
BA(ϕ → ψ) → (BΦϕ → BΨψ),
where Ψ is equal to, or at a higher (more believed) level than Φ . We will note this for future reference, but not make it an
axiom at this stage.
The D axiom (serial) can be applied without any alteration to all levels except BE and BI and is represented as the
property PB8.
BΠϕ → PΠϕ(
where Π ∈ Levels− {E, I}). (PB8)
Notice that this axiom corresponds to the internal consistency of the modal operator. This means that the agent is taken to
be a rational agent. An example of PB8 for level U1 is
BU1ϕ → PU1ϕ,
and by using PB7, this can be converted to
BU1ϕ → (BAϕ ∨ BU1ϕ ∨ BU2ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BUnϕ ∨ BEϕ ∨ BIϕ ∨ BWnϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BW2ϕ ∨ BDϕ).
The left side of the implication, BU1ϕ , is included on the right side and this is then a tautology. A problem with applying D
to the BI level is as follows. PΦϕ = ¬BΦ¬ϕ for level I is
PIϕ = ¬BI¬ϕ.
By axiom AB7, this can be converted to
PIϕ = ¬BIϕ.
So, it follows that the D axiom for I, BIϕ → PIϕ , would be converted to
BIϕ → ¬BIϕ.
This is obviously false and therefore BIϕ → PIϕ cannot be true, and nor can BEϕ → PEϕ , for which the same applies through
axiom AB6. This may not be as damaging as it appears. Remember that Doxastic Ignorance is an absence of any belief and
Doxastic Equivalence is an absence of deﬁnite belief for or against the formula in question. Therefore, we can still say that
D or seriality holds for all the levels of actual effective belief.
Normally, the axiom 4, or transitivity, is used for positive introspection. To demonstrate the problem with transitivity
being used for positive introspection for these belief levels, let us apply transitivity to the D level of belief (disbelief) which
results in
BDϕ → BD BDϕ.
This means that if the formula ϕ is strongly disbelieved, that disbelief is strongly disbelieved. By converting through PB1,
we get
BA¬ϕ → BA¬BA¬ϕ,
or by replacing ¬ϕ with an equivalent formula ψ , we get
BAψ → BA¬BAψ.
This is deﬁnitely neither the axiom of transitivity, nor that of positive introspection. However, by altering the 4 axiom of
transitivity, we show that we can retain positive introspection. In axiom AB9, we lock the ﬁrst belief level on the right side
of the axiom to absolute belief, and thereby get true positive introspection, which is what we are really seeking here.
BΦϕ → BA BΦϕ. (AB9)
The axiom 5, or Euclidean, is used for negative introspection. To demonstrate the problem with Euclidity for these belief
levels, let us apply the 5 axiom to the D level of belief,
PDϕ → BD PDϕ.
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(BU1ϕ ∨ BU2ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BUnϕ ∨ BEϕ ∨ BIϕ ∨ BWnϕ ∨ BWn−1ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BW1ϕ ∨ BDϕ) →
BD(BU1ϕ ∨ BU2ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BUnϕ ∨ BEϕ ∨ BIϕ ∨ BWnϕ ∨ BWn−1ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BW1ϕ ∨ BDϕ).
So, if the disjunction of formulae on the left of the statement is true, then this implies that we disbelieve that same
disjunction of formulae. This is not what we want and is not true negative introspection. However, we can alter the 5 axiom
in a similar manner to that of our alteration of the 4 axiom to allow negative introspection. In axiom AB10, we again lock
the ﬁrst belief level on the right side of the axiom to absolute belief, and thereby get true negative introspection, which is
what we really want.
PΦϕ → BA PΦϕ. (AB10)
These axioms of introspection hold and are perfectly consistent. As well, these altered KD45 axioms seem to hold for all
belief levels. The only possible problem is regarding the BI and BE levels, in not holding for the D axiom. However, due to
BI not being an actual level of belief and BE not being a deﬁnite level of belief, this problem can be essentially ignored. So,
while this logic does not strictly follow the KD45 system because of the issues with grading, it follows the closest possible
approximation of it, as we outlined.
Notice that given the combination of axioms AB1 and AB2 we have that 	 holds only for one belief level. Thus, we
assume the following axiom.
BA(ϕ → ϕ). (AB11)
Accordingly, we have that modal operator BA is a normal modal operator, while all other belief levels are characterised by
non-normal modal operators.
2.3. Levels of goals
Desires and Intentions can both be considered types of goals, with desires being weak goals and intentions being strong
goals (i.e. desire + commitment = intention). As stated in the introduction, our conventional BDI agent either has a given
desire, or it doesn’t. But, it is quite conceivable for an agent to have desires of varying degrees of strength. For example,
the desire to live/survive is going to be stronger than the desire to go to work, which in turn is stronger than the desire
to go jogging on a hot day (at least it is for the authors). So, having levels of desire gives our agent more versatility in
representing a wider range of situations. Where belief of a formula ϕ relates mainly to ϕ being true in the current state of
applicable possible worlds, the desire (and intention) of ϕ usually pertains to its truth in other (i.e. future) worlds.
The framework of levels introduced for beliefs is easily extended to desires and also intentions. Essentially, each goal
level (desire/intention) will have a not dissimilar meaning to equivalent belief levels. The difference between goals being
that a given desire, among several desires, will only become an intention if it is committed to by the agent. The agent may
have many conﬂicting desires but should have no conﬂicting intentions if it is a rational agent.
The desire levels we consider are deﬁned as follows (as with belief, i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, and n ∈ Z+):
• DAϕ denotes that ϕ is absolutely or strongly desired and is the strongest desire level (e.g. to survive, to be happy).
• DUiϕ means ϕ is desired at a moderate level, less than DA, whereas with the belief Ui level, the number of levels n
within DU is domain and application dependent. For example, the desire to “earn money” may be a DU1 desire whereas
the desire to “do work” may be at a weaker level of desire, say DU3.
• DEϕ applies if the formulae ϕ and ¬ϕ are equally desired by the agent. It may apply to alternatives of which the agent
has no preference of one over the other (e.g. to get to work the agent desires to “walk”/“drive”/“catch a bus”). This can
be described as Goal Indifference.
• DIϕ applies if neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ is desired at all by the agent and could possibly also be described as goal indifference,
but is probably more accurately described as Goal Ignorance.
• DWiϕ denotes that ϕ is only weakly desired, that is, a goal that the agent usually doesn’t wish for (e.g. “go bungee
jumping” [indicated as a DW level due to author’s fear of heights – it may be a DU level for a thrill-seeking type agent]).
This is the mirror of DUi (equivalent to DUi¬ϕ).
• DDϕ means that ϕ is deﬁnitely not desired (e.g. “have an accident driving home”), and is the mirror of DA, or equivalent
to DA¬ϕ .
• PD represents desire possibility and is the diamond () to desire’s box () (PDΦϕ = ¬DΦ¬ϕ).
• PI represents intention possibility and is the diamond () to intention’s box () (PIΦϕ = ¬IΦ¬ϕ).
As to the Intention levels, they have essentially the same meaning as the desire levels, as they are a committed desire.
After deliberation, an agent commits to a particular desire, thereby creating an intention of the same level (e.g. DU2ϕ +
commitment = IU2ϕ). The desire and intention axioms and properties are essentially the same as those of belief, with the
letter B being replaced by D or I respectively and P being replaced by PD or PI respectively. Therefore we will not take
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However, there may be further altered introspection axioms of the form of
DΦϕ → BA DΦϕ,
so that if a formula is desired at a given level of desire, then the desire of that formula at that given level is absolutely
believed by the agent. This would naturally also apply to intention, that is,
IΦϕ → BA IΦϕ.
A similar extension to A10 for negative introspection of desire would be expressed by
PDΦϕ → BA PDΦϕ,
and similarly for intention,
PIΦϕ → BA PIΦϕ.
Again, while the semantics support these, we will not make a formal axiom of them, but merely note them for possible
future use.
3. Semantics
The semantics of this logic was originally modelled loosely on the semantics of Rao & Georgeff’s original logic [18,19]
in the previous work of [3,4], but with the revisions in this paper, it has been modularised to separate those components
that are independent of the agent itself. This has been carried out in a manner not dissimilar to that presented in [20,21].
We will deﬁne a Model M to be a non-normal Kripke structure within which we might place any structure that requires
positioning in a ‘partitioned’ worlds environment. This structure has been inﬂuenced by, and follows the general forms of,
Minimal/Neighbourhood semantics [11]. We will also deﬁne an Agent A , in particular a BDI agent, which encapsulates levels
in its composition. Finally we will tie these two together in a System S . Now we formally deﬁne each of these structures.
3.1. Neighbourhood semantics
We introduce the neighbourhood semantics characterising the axiomatisation proposed in Section 2.2.
Deﬁnition 2. A Model M is a tuple 〈W ,N, V 〉, where
1) W is a set of worlds.
2) N , is a set of ‘neighborhood’ functions where each function NZ ∈ N has the signature NZ : W × Levels → 22W .
3) V is a function mapping atomic formulae at worlds to a truth value; that is, V : P × W → {false, true}. We say that p
is true at w iff V (p,w) = true; and say that p is false at w iff V (p,w) = false.
The above deﬁnition is essentially the standard deﬁnition of a neighbourhood model for a multi-modal logic, where
each modal operator Z has its own neighbourhood function NZ , however, in the deﬁnition we have combined all such
function into a single function indexed by the modal operators (levels). As we will see the modal operators will partition
the proposition in the language, thus having a single neighbourhood function simply the representation of the condition
that the neighbourhood functions for the level partition the power set of possible worlds.
Deﬁnition 3. The truth of formulae ϕ in L is deﬁned as:
1) If M = 〈W ,N, V 〉, p ∈ P , and w ∈ W , then we deﬁne
(M ,w)  p iff V (p,w) = true.
2) If M = 〈W ,N, V 〉, for each modal operator, Z , there is a function NZ ∈ N , and if Φ ∈ Levels, w ∈ W , and ϕ ∈ L, the
truth of modal formulae are deﬁned by:
(M ,w)  ZΦϕ iff ‖ϕ‖ ∈ NZ (w,Φ) where ‖ϕ‖ =
{
w ∈ W : (M ,w)  ϕ}.
3) If M = 〈W ,N, V 〉, w ∈ W , and ϕ ∈ L, then we deﬁne
(M ,w) ¬ϕ iff (M ,w)  ϕ,
(M ,w)  ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M ,w)  ϕ and (M ,w) ψ,
(M ,w)  ϕ ∨ ψ iff (M ,w)  ϕ or (M ,w) ψ,
(M ,w)  ϕ → ψ iff (M ,w)  ϕ or (M ,w) ψ.
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Deﬁnition 4. If ϕ is any formula then the truth set of ϕ , ‖ϕ‖, is deﬁned by
‖ϕ‖ = {w ∈ W : (M ,w)  ϕ}.
Deﬁnition 5. We now further reﬁne N in the model M so that M = 〈W , {NB ,ND ,NI }, V 〉. If NZ ∈ N , Φ ∈ Levels, and
w,w ′ ∈ W , then N satisﬁes the following conditions:
a) If X ∈ NZ (w,Φ) then W − X ∈ NZ (w,ΦM).
b) If X ∈ NZ (w,A) and ((W − X) ∪ Y ) ∈ NZ (w,Φ), then Y ∈ NZ (w,Φ).
c) If Φ = Ψ then NZ (w,Φ) ∩ NZ (w,Ψ ) = {}.
d)
⋃{NZ (w,Φ): Φ ∈ Levels} = 2W for every world w .
e) If X ∈ NZ (w,Φ) then {w ′: X ∈ NZ (w ′,Φ)} ∈ NB(w,A).
f) If X /∈ NZ (w,Φ) then {w ′: X /∈ NZ (w ′,Φ)} ∈ NB(w,A).
g) W ∈ NZ (w,A).
Let us quickly comment on the conditions given in Deﬁnition 5. Condition a) establishes the ‘mirror’ relationships be-
tween the Wi and Ui modalities, thus it corresponds to axioms A4–A7. Condition b) characterises axiom A8. Condition c)
states that any two distinct levels have non-overlapping neighbourhood sets, thus any proposition is true (at most) for only
one level; this is encoded in axiom A2; in combination with condition d) it can be seen that {NZ (w,Φ): Φ ∈ Levels} is a
partition of 2W , thus we have axiom A1. Condition g) is the standard condition on neighbourhood models for axiom A11.
Similarly, parts e) and f) are the condition for positive and negative introspection for a modal operator Z with respect to
absolute belief.
Theorem 1. The logic axiomatised by axioms A1–A11 is determined by the class of minimal models satisfying Deﬁnition 5.
The proof of the theorem is given in Appendices A and B.
3.2. Agents
In the previous section we have shown how to give a possible world semantics for the logic we deﬁned in Section 2.2. In
this section we are going to show a possible way to ground an agent to the semantics we have just provided. The procedure
is as follows: an agent speciﬁes a degree of belief, desire, intention for each proposition the agent believes, desires or
intends. The degree is express as a value in the range [0,1], the assignment of values is constrained by the conditions given
in Deﬁnition 7. Furthermore, an agent establishes a (total) linear order (over the given range) to be able to classify the
proposition over the levels of the appropriate mental attitudes (Deﬁnition 6). The ﬁnal step is to build the model based on
the assignments just described (Deﬁnition 8).
Deﬁnition 6.
1) For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, we deﬁne di , the division points for the levels, as follows: di ∈ {x ∈ Q: 0 · 5 x < 1}, dn = 0 · 5,
and for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}, di < di−1. (Q represents the set of rational numbers.)
2) To relate the division points to the U and W levels, we deﬁne
(a) Q(U1) = {x ∈ Q: d1 < x< 1},
(b) for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}, Q(Ui) = {x ∈ Q: di < x di−1},
(c) for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}, Q(Wi) = {x ∈ Q: 1− di−1  x< 1− di}, and
(d) Q(W1) = {x ∈ Q: 0< x< 1− d1}.
3) We deﬁne the equivalence relation ≈ on Q ∪ {u}, where u represents undeﬁned.
x ≈ y iff either (i) x = y, or
(ii) for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, {x, y} ⊆ Q(Ui), or
(iii) for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, {x, y} ⊆ Q(Wi).
Deﬁnition 7. An Agent A is a tuple 〈β, δ, ι〉 where β , δ, and ι are functions for belief, desire and intention respectively
which take a world w and a formula ϕ ∈ L believed (resp. desired, intended) at a particular level of belief (resp. desire,
intention) and returns a number that represents the level of belief (resp. desire, intention) that ϕ is held in at w . Suppose
γ ∈ {β, δ, ι} and ϕ,ψ ∈ L, then we require:
a) γ : W × L → {x ∈ Q: 0 x 1} ∪ {u}.
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c) γ (w, (ϕ → ϕ)) = 1, and if γ (w,ϕ) = 1 then γ (w,ψ) = γ (w, (¬ϕ ∨ ψ)).
d) β(w, {w ′ ∈ W : γ (w ′,ϕ) ≈ γ (w,ϕ)}) = 1.
The main idea of the above deﬁnition is that an agent associates to each possible world and each proposition a level of
belief, desire and intention (clause a). Then clause b) checks that the complement of a proposition is associated to the
mirror level associated to the proposition. Condition c) ensures that propositions are closed under classical propositional
logic. Finally, the intuition behind the last condition is fully aware (absolutely believes) to what degree she believes, intends
and desires each proposition. In other terms that the agent’s absolute beliefs are fully introspective.
Deﬁnition 8. We deﬁne a System S as the tuple 〈M ,A〉 where M and A are as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2 and Deﬁnition 7
respectively. M is reﬁned as in Deﬁnition 5, that is, N is restricted to the set of three functions NB , ND , and NI . If
Z ∈ {B, D, I}, then deﬁne Z ′ by B ′ = β , D ′ = δ, I ′ = ι. Given ϕ ∈ L, we deﬁne NZ (w,Φ) as follows:
a) NZ (w,A) = {‖ϕ‖ ⊆ W : Z ′(w,ϕ) = 1}.
b) For i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, NZ (w,Ui) = {‖ϕ‖ ⊆ W : Z ′(w,ϕ) ∈ Q(Ui)}.
c) NZ (w,E) = {‖ϕ‖ ⊆ W : Z ′(w,ϕ) = 0 · 5}.
d) For i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, NZ (w,Wi) = {‖ϕ‖ ⊆ W : Z ′(w,ϕ) ∈ Q(Wi)}.
e) NZ (w,D) = {‖ϕ‖ ⊆ W : Z ′(w,ϕ) = 0}.
f) NZ (w, I) = {‖ϕ‖ ⊆ W : Z ′(w,ϕ) = u}.
Deﬁnition 8 shows how to build a neighbourhood model starting from the degree of belief, desire and intention associ-
ated to each proposition.
A System and Agent created from the conditions deﬁned in Deﬁnitions 6 to 8 is consistent with the conditions of a
Model as deﬁned in Deﬁnitions 2 to 5. Veriﬁcation of this can be seen in Appendix C.
Reasoning among various mentalistic levels is accomplished through priorities or a total order between levels. Note that
the place in this order of the level I (with a γ value of u) is domain dependent. It may, most commonly, be placed equal
with E at 0 · 5. For belief, this order of levels would then effectively be
BA> BU1 > BU2 > · · · > BUn > BE = BI> BWn > BWn−1 > · · · > BW1 > BD,
and given Φ,Ψ ∈ Levels,
BΦϕ > BΨψ
signiﬁes BΦϕ has a higher belief than BΨψ . So, BΦϕ > BΨψ means that
‖ϕ‖ ∈ NB(w,Φ),





This latter may be intuitively written as
β(ϕ) > β(ψ),
as β(w, X) may be simpliﬁed to β(ϕ) where the current world w is obvious and X = ‖ϕ‖. Reasoning among desires is
carried out in a similar manner. Intentions would be created by the agent committing to the desire (selected from among
desires whose time for possible execution is at the same time) with the highest δ value. The ι value of that intention would
nominally be set as being the same as the δ value of the desire it is created to carry out.
4. Scheduling example
Continuing the scheduling agent example of Helen’s personal assistant software started in the introduction, we examine
four seminars and one meeting, notiﬁcations that Helen has received pertaining to one day. These are listed in the knowl-
edge (facts) in Table 1. Helen has previously recorded her beliefs and desires with the scheduling system and her desires
and beliefs relevant for this example are listed in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. As can be seen, there are conﬂicts in
the timing of the various events, thus an agent cannot attend all of them. For this example we are setting the value of n
(number of Ui and Wi levels) to 5, giving 14 levels in each of belief, desire, or intention.
We now suggest rules for combining desires in the scheduling example domain. They may also be used in other domains
if suited. First, we suggest that there are two types of desires, dependent and independent. Dependent desires are those
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Facts relevant to the scheduling example.
Knowledge (Facts) Formula
Fred speaks on Robotics in room Nrm1 at time t1. seminar(Fred,Robotics,Nrm1, t1)
Alice speaks on Agent Technology in room Nrm1 at time t2. seminar(Alice,Agents,Nrm1, t2)
The University Council is meeting in room Lrm1 at time t2. meeting(ucm, Lrm1, t2)
Sam speaks on BDI Agents at room UQrm4 at time t2. seminar(Sam,BDI,UQrm4, t2)
Rex speaks on Nonmonotonic Reasoning in room Lrm2 at t1. seminar(Rex,NMR, Lrm2, t1)
Table 2
Helen’s desires including those relevant to scheduling example.
Helen’s desires δ Formula
Strongly to attend seminars by Fred. ·92 DU1(semSpeak(Fred))
To usually attend seminars by Sam. ·75 DU3(semSpeak(Sam))
To usually attend seminars by Alice. ·75 DU3(semSpeak(Alice))
To usually not attend seminars by Rex. ·25 DW3(semSpeak(Rex))
Absolutely to attend Albert’s seminars. 1 DA(semSpeak(Albert))
Indifferent to attending Robotics seminars. ·5 DE(semTopic(Robotics))
To usually attend seminars on Nonmonotonic Reasoning. ·75 DU3(semTopic(NMR))
To usually attend seminars on Agent Technology. ·75 DU3(semTopic(Agents))
Strongly to attend BDI Agent seminars. ·95 DU1(semTopic(BDI))
Strongly to not attend IS seminars. ·12 DW2(semTopic(InfoSys))
Never to attend Image Processing seminars. 0 DD(semTopic(ImgProc))
To usually attend University Council Meetings. ·75 DU3(attend(UCM))
Table 3
Helen’s beliefs relevant to scheduling example.
Helen’s beliefs β Formula
Believes strongly that Nrm1 is easy to travel to. ·97 BU1(ease[goto(Nrm1)])
Believes that location Lrm1 is moderately easy to travel to. ·85 BU2(ease[goto(Lrm1)])
Believes that location Lrm2 is moderately easy to travel to. ·85 BU2(ease[goto(Lrm2)])
Believes absolutely the wait is short. 1 BA(ease[wait])
Believes that UQrm4 is usually easy to travel to. ·75 BU3(ease[goto(UQrm4)])
Believes that location Lrm1 is very easy to travel to from Lrm2. ·97 BU1(ease[gofromto(Lrm2, Lrm1)])
that are part of a more complex desire. A desire to hear a particular speaker, or, a desire to hear a talk on a particular topic
are dependent desires, that is, they need to be combined to stand alone as an independent desire. For example, we desire
to hear Fred speak, but he will be speaking on a particular topic. We are indifferent in our desire to hear the topic robotics,
so if Fred is speaking on robotics, we suggest that the desire to hear Fred talk on Robotics is less than the desire to hear
Fred speak, but more than the desire to hear about Robotics. Formally, to ﬁnd the δ value of two dependent desires a and b
(of the form DΦϕ where Φ ∈ Levels and ϕ ∈ L [note that we abbreviate δ(a) to δa and δ(b) to δb]), we use the formula:
δ(a ∧ b) = (δa + δb) ÷ 2. (F1)
Combining two independent or stand alone desires, is totally different, e.g. the desire to attend two seminars should be
higher than the desire to only attend either one of them, all other issues being equal. To ﬁnd the δ value of two independent
desires a and b (of the form DΦϕ), we use the formula:
δ(a ∧ b) =
{
f (δa, δb) if δa > 0 · 5 and δb > 0 · 5,
1− f (1− δa,1− δb) if δa < 0 · 5 and δb < 0 · 5,
δa + δb − 0 · 5 otherwise.
(F2)
The formula (F2) agrees with Casali’s unspeciﬁed approach in her travel example [9,10].
An approximate graphical representation of the relevant worlds with their desires, beliefs and intentions is presented in
Fig. 1. This diagram includes the separate ‘seminar’ events as possible worlds, with the world w6 containing the two events
represented in worlds w1 and w2. This is to allow the consideration of the desire of attending w1, or w2, or attending
both of them together. Also w7 contains the two events represented in worlds w4 and w5 so that they can be similarly
considered.






)∧ DE(semTopic(Robotics)))= ((·92+ ·5) ÷ 2)= ·71.
So, while the above gave us the basic desire for world w1 has a δ value of ·71, to get the overall δ value of attending w1,
we must apply the belief to getting to the associated event. To get this we apply the product of the belief to that basic
desire to result in the end desire.






ease[goto Nrm1])∧ δ(seminar(Fred,Robotics,Nth1, t1)))= ·97× ·71 = ·6887 (rounded to · 69).
Similarly, seminar(Alice,Agents,Nrm1, t2) (i.e. w2) results in a δ value of ·75 and after applying the belief about getting
there, becomes a value of ·73. Therefore, the evaluation of the desire of world w6 which combines both the seminars of w1






)∧ (β(ease[wait])∧ δ(seminar(Alice,Agents,Nrm1, t2))))
= δ(·71∧ (1× ·75)) (waiting and seminars’ desires combined)
= max(·71, ·75) + ((1−max(·71, ·75) ×min(·71, ·75) − ·5))
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= ·75+ (·25× ·21)
= ·75+ ·0525
= ·8025.
Note the overall δ value of the second event is different from that of w2 because of the difference of the belief of merely
waiting at Nrm1 as opposed to getting to Nrm1 in w2. For the overall δ value of w6, we apply the belief value of getting to
Nrm1: ·8025 · 97 = ·7784 (rounded to ·78).
By similar calculations, attending seminar(Sam,BDI,UQrm4, t2)(w3) has an overall δ value of ·85 × ·75 = ·6375 (·64),
attending seminar(Rex,NMR, Lrm2, t1)(w4) has an overall δ value of ·5× ·85 = ·425, and meeting(ucm, Lrm1, t2)(w5) has an





ease[goto Lrm1])∧ (δ(seminar(Rex,NMR, Lrm2, t1))∧(
β
(
ease[gofromto Lrm2 from Lrm2])∧ δ(meeting(ucm, Lrm1, t2)))))
= ·85× (·5+ (·97× ·75) − ·5)
= ·85× (·5+ ·7275− ·5)
= ·85× ·7275
= ·6184 (rounded to · 62).
Note that the desire calculation of w7, did not use the function f within (F2), but calculation went to the ‘otherwise’ of
(δa + δb − 0 · 5) because δa was 0 · 5. This really justiﬁes this aspect of (F2), as the calculation using f would have been
0 ·86 (before applying the belief of ease of going there). Logically, a desire of indifference should not boost (or drop) another
desire when combined with it. In the calculation used, before the applying of the belief of going to the pair of seminars,
the δ was ·7275, exactly the δ value of the other desire (being the combination of the meeting and going to the meeting).
Therefore, the desire with a δ of 0 · 5 had a neutral effect when combined with another desire, which is as it should be.
So the world w6 results in being the most desired world (·78 over ·73, ·69, ·64, ·62 and ·425) and the desire to bring
about w6 is therefore converted to an intention with an ι value of ·78. This equates to the relevant formulae in w6 being
intended at an intention level of IU3.
5. Conclusion and future work
The framework undertaken in this paper provides an environment that may be used with any agent or device that re-
quires graduated modality. This is extended to give a foundation for a layered BDI architecture, which essentially enables
a rational agent to capture commonsense reasoning. We believe that representing and reasoning with levels of mentalis-
tic attitudes signiﬁcantly enhances an agent’s ability to perform human-like practical reasoning in complex domains. The
proposed framework is simpler and more intuitive than other BDI frameworks, including that of Casali. Intended future
work involves introducing this basic framework into an existing BDI agent platform, most likely the AgentSpeak(L) platform,
JASON. Naturally this may necessitate dropping the strictly modal aspects of this logic, but the semantics, as stated, should
be able to be easily adapted to JASON.
Some issues left unanswered by this work are that often it is not clear how many levels of the mentalistic notions are
needed in a given application, and how to determine the division points, and the degree of belief, intention and desire.
In the scheduling example we have used adjectives qualifying the various mentalistic notions (e.g., “strongly”, “usually”,
“strongly not”, . . . ). A similar approach can be used to describe the levels in a particular application based on the knowledge
of the domain by a domain expert. For the second and third issues we have used quantitative methods, but we could have
used qualitative methods where the designer of an application can simply elicit the information again using adjectives to
qualify the various levels (provided the adjectives determine an order of the levels).
This paper was part of Jeff’s research for his PhD. This paper constitutes part of the theoretical foundation of how to
model agents. Jeff passed away before he was able to complete his research. He was working on methodologies to build
agent based applications and he was investigating some of the issues discussed above.
Appendix A. Soundness proofs
In this appendix, we shall prove that each of the axioms and properties given in Section 2.2 are sound in respect of the
semantics given in Section 3.
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First we give and prove some lemmas that will be helpful in our soundness proofs.
Let ϕ and ψ be any formulae in our countable language L,n ∈ Z+ , Φ,Ψ ∈ Levels, and M = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model.
Lemma A.1.1. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model.
If ∀w ∈ W (M ,w)  (ϕ ≡ ψ), then ‖ϕ‖ = ‖ψ‖.
Proof. Suppose that ∀w ∈ W ,
(M ,w)  (ϕ ≡ ψ).








By Deﬁnition 3-2, it follows that
w ′ ∈ ‖ψ‖.
Therefore
‖ϕ‖ ⊆ ‖ψ‖.
By a similar method, we may take any world w ∈ ‖ψ‖ and prove that w ∈ ‖ϕ‖, and thereby prove that ‖ψ‖ ⊆ ‖ϕ‖.
Therefore ‖ϕ‖ = ‖ψ‖ and Lemma A.1.1 is proved. 
Lemma A.1.2. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model. Then
‖¬ϕ‖ = W − ‖ϕ‖.
Proof. Let us take the truth set of a formula ϕ:
‖¬ϕ‖ = {w ∈ W : (M ,w) ¬ϕ} by Deﬁnition 4
= {w ∈ W : (M ,w)  ϕ} by Deﬁnition 3-3
= W − {w ∈ W : (M ,w)  ϕ}
= W − ‖ϕ‖ by Deﬁnition 4.
Thus Lemma A.1.2 is proved. 
Lemma A.1.3. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model. Then
‖ϕ → ψ‖ = ‖¬ϕ‖ ∪ ‖ψ‖.
Proof.
‖ϕ → ψ‖ = {w ∈ W : (M ,w)  ϕ → ψ} by Deﬁnition 4
= {w ∈ W : (M ,w)  ϕ or (M ,w) ψ} by Deﬁnition 3-3
= {w ∈ W : (M ,w) ¬ϕ or (M ,w) ψ} by Deﬁnition 3-3
= {w ∈ W : (M ,w) ¬ϕ}∪ {w ∈ W : (M ,w) ψ}
= ‖¬ϕ‖ ∪ ‖ψ‖.
Thus Lemma A.1.3 is proved. 
Lemma A.1.4. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model.
If X ∈ NZ (w,A) and X ⊆ Y ⊆ W then Y ∈ NZ (w,A).
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X ∈ NZ (w,A),
Y ∈ NZ (w,Φ), and
X ⊆ Y ⊆ W .
If we replace Φ with A in Deﬁnition 5b, we have:
If X ∈ NZ (w,A) and (W − X) ∪ Y ∈ NZ (w,A), then Y ∈ NZ (w,A).
Since it is the case that X ∈ NZ (w,A) and by Deﬁnition 5g, W ∈ NZ (w,A), therefore it follows that
Y ∈ NZ (w,A).
Thus Lemma A.1.4 is proved. 
Lemma A.1.5. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model.
If X ⊆ W and X /∈ NZ (w,Φ), then{




Proof. Let us suppose that X ⊆ W and
X /∈ NZ (w,Φ).
By Deﬁnition 5d, there is a level Ψ such that Φ = Ψ and
X ∈ NZ (w,Ψ ).
By Deﬁnition 5e, it follows that
{
w ′ ∈ W : X ∈ NZ
(
w ′,Ψ
)} ∈ NB(w,A). (1)
Take any w ′ in {w ′ ∈ W : X ∈ NZ (w ′,Ψ )}. Then X ∈ NZ (w ′,Ψ ).
So by Deﬁnition 5c, X /∈ NZ (w ′,Φ) and therefore
w ′ ∈ {w ′ ∈ W : X /∈ NZ (w ′,Φ)}.
Thus {
w ′ ∈ W : X ∈ NZ
(
w ′,Ψ
)}⊆ {w ′ ∈ W : X /∈ NZ (w ′,Φ)}.
So, by (1) and Lemma A.1.4,{




Thus Lemma A.1.5 is proved. 
Lemma A.1.6. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model. Then
‖ϕ → ϕ‖ = W .
Proof.
‖ϕ → ϕ‖ = {w ∈ W : (M ,w)  ϕ → ϕ} by Deﬁnition 4
= {w ∈ W : (M ,w)  ϕ or (M ,w)  ϕ} by Deﬁnition 3-3
= W .
Thus Lemma A.1.6 is proved. 
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We shall now show that for any model and any world in that model, each of our axioms and properties are true.
BAϕ∨ BU1ϕ ∨ BU2ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BUnϕ ∨ BIϕ ∨ BEϕ ∨ BWnϕ ∨ BWn−1ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BW1ϕ ∨ BDϕ. (A1)
Lemma A.2.1. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model, ϕ be a formula, and Z ∈ {B,D, I}. Then
(M ,w)  ZAϕ ∨ ZU1ϕ ∨ ZU2ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ ZUnϕ ∨ ZIϕ ∨ ZEϕ ∨ ZWnϕ ∨ ZWn−1ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ ZW1ϕ ∨ ZDϕ.
Proof. Take any world w ∈ W , by Deﬁnition 4, there is a formula ϕ , such that,
‖ϕ‖ = {w ∈ W : (M ,w)  ϕ}.
By Deﬁnition 5d, it follows that for at least one level Φ where Φ ∈ Levels,
‖ϕ‖ ∈ NZ (w,Φ),
and therefore then,
(M ,w)  ZΦϕ.
Therefore, by Deﬁnition 3-3, it follows that
(M ,w)  ZAϕ ∨ ZU1ϕ ∨ ZU2ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ ZUnϕ ∨ ZIϕ ∨ ZEϕ ∨ ZWnϕ ∨ ZWn−1ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ ZW1ϕ ∨ ZDϕ.
Therefore, Lemma A.2.1 is proved and axiom A1 veriﬁed. 
If Φ = Ψ, then BΦϕ → ¬BΨϕ. (A2)
Lemma A.2.2. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model, ϕ be a formula, Φ,Ψ ∈ Levels, and Z ∈ {B,D, I}.
If Φ = Ψ then (M ,w)  ZΦϕ → ¬ZΨϕ .
Proof. Take any world w ∈ W . Let us suppose that Φ = Ψ and that
(M ,w)  ZΦϕ. (1)
By Deﬁnition 3-2, it follows that
‖ϕ‖ ∈ NZ (w,Φ).
Therefore by Deﬁnition 5c,
‖ϕ‖ /∈ NZ (w,Ψ ).
By Deﬁnition 3-2, it follows that
(M ,w)  ZΨϕ
and therefore by Deﬁnition 3-3 that
(M ,w) ¬ZΨϕ. (2)
From (1) and (2), it follows that
(M ,w)  ZΦϕ → ¬ZΨϕ.
Therefore, Lemma A.2.2 is proved and so A2 is veriﬁed. 
If ϕ ≡ ψ, then BΦϕ ≡ BΦψ. (A3)
Lemma A.2.3. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model, ϕ and ψ be formulae, Φ ∈ Levels, and Z ∈ {B,D, I}.
If (M ,w)  ϕ ≡ ψ then (M ,w)  ZΦϕ ≡ ZΦψ .
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(M ,w)  ϕ ≡ ψ, (1)
and that
(M ,w)  ZΦϕ. (2)
By Deﬁnition 3-2, it follows from (2) that
‖ϕ‖ ∈ NZ (w,Φ). (3)
By Lemma A.1.1, it follows from (1) and (3) that
‖ψ‖ ∈ NZ (w,Φ).
Therefore, by Deﬁnition 3-2,
(M ,w)  ZΦψ. (4)
Given (2) and (4), therefore it follows that
(M ,w)  ZΦϕ → ZΦψ.
By supposing (1) and (4), we can arrive at (2) by a similar manner. Therefore we can similarly prove that
(M ,w)  ZΦψ → ZΦϕ
and therefore,
(M ,w)  ZΦϕ ≡ ZΦψ.
Thus Lemma A.2.3 is proved and axiom A3 is veriﬁed. 
BAϕ ≡ BD¬ϕ. (A4)
BDϕ ≡ BA¬ϕ. (P1)
For each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, BUiϕ ≡ BWi¬ϕ. (A5)
For each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, BWiϕ ≡ BUi¬ϕ. (P2)
BEϕ ≡ BE¬ϕ. (A6)
BIϕ ≡ BI¬ϕ. (A7)
Lemma A.2.4. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model, ϕ be a formula, Φ ∈ Levels, ΦM be the mirror of Φ as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1.1, and
Z ∈ {B,D, I}, then
(M ,w)  ZΦϕ ≡ ZΦM¬ϕ.
Proof. Take any world w ∈ W . Let us suppose that
(M ,w)  ZΦϕ. (1)
By Deﬁnition 3-2, it follows that
‖ϕ‖ ∈ NZ (w,Φ).
By Deﬁnitions 5a and 1.1, it follows that











By Deﬁnition 3, it then follows that
(M ,w)  ZΦM¬ϕ. (2)
So, from (1) and (2), it follows that
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Let us suppose (2). By a similar method to that of how we derived (3) above, it follows that we can derive (1). Therefore, it
follows that
(M ,w)  ZΦM¬ϕ → ZΦϕ. (4)
From (3) and (4), it follows that (M ,w)  ZΦϕ ≡ ZΦM¬ϕ . Thus, Lemma A.2.4 is proved. 
Lemma A.2.4 veriﬁes that axioms A4, A5, A6, and A7 are correct in the semantics.
P1 and P2 follow from A4 and A5 respectively by replacing ϕ with ¬ϕ and are thus similarly correct.
BΠϕ → ¬BIϕ ∧ ¬BI¬ϕ(
where Π ∈ Levels− {I}). (P3)
Lemma A.2.5. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model, ϕ be a formula, Π ∈ Levels− {I}, and Z ∈ {B,D, I}, then
(M ,w)  ZΠϕ → ¬ZIϕ ∧ ¬ZI¬ϕ.
Proof. Take any world w ∈ W . Let us suppose that
(M ,w)  ZΠϕ.
By axiom A2, it follows that
(M ,w) ¬ZIϕ. (1)
Therefore, it follows that
(M ,w)  ZΠϕ → ¬ZIϕ. (2)
By axiom A7, it follows from (1) that (M ,w) ¬ZI¬ϕ , and thus
(M ,w)  ZΠϕ → ¬ZI¬ϕ. (3)
It follows from (2) and (3) that
(M ,w)  ZΠϕ → ¬ZIϕ ∧ ¬ZI¬ϕ.
Therefore, Lemma A.2.5 is proved and property P3 is veriﬁed. 
BIϕ → ¬BAϕ ∧ ¬BU1ϕ ∧ ¬BU2ϕ ∧ · · · ∧ ¬BUnϕ ∧ ¬BEϕ ∧
¬BE¬ϕ ∧ ¬BUn¬ϕ ∧ · · · ∧ ¬BU2¬ϕ ∧ ¬BU1¬ϕ ∧ ¬BA¬ϕ. (P4)
BIϕ → ¬BAϕ ∧ ¬BU1ϕ ∧ ¬BU2ϕ ∧ · · · ∧ ¬BUnϕ ∧ ¬BEϕ ∧
¬BE¬ϕ ∧ ¬BWnϕ ∧ · · · ∧ ¬BW2ϕ ∧ ¬BW1ϕ ∧ ¬BDϕ. (P5)
Lemma A.2.6. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model, ϕ be a formula, Π ∈ Levels− {I}, and Z ∈ {B,D, I}, then
(M ,w)  ZIϕ → ¬ZΠϕ.
Proof. Take any world w ∈ W . Let us suppose that
(M ,w)  ZIϕ.
By Lemma A.2.2, it follows that
(M ,w)  ZIϕ → ¬ZΠϕ.
Thus Lemma A.2.6 is proved. 
If we expand ZΠϕ to the concatenation of all the levels in Π , it follows that P5 is veriﬁed.
By using Lemma A.2.4, P5 can be easily converted into P4, and so P4 is also veriﬁed.
BIϕ ≡ ¬PIϕ. (P6)
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then
(M ,w)  ZIϕ ≡ ¬PZIϕ.
Proof. Take any world w ∈ W . Let us suppose that
(M ,w)  ZIϕ.
By Lemma A.2.4, (M ,w) ¬ZIϕ , and also the reverse as well, so therefore,
(M ,w)  ZIϕ ≡ ¬ZIϕ.
By Deﬁnition 1, it follows that
(M ,w)  ZIϕ ≡ ¬PZI¬¬ϕ,
which is effectively equivalent to
(M ,w)  ZIϕ ≡ ¬PZIϕ.
Thus Lemma A.2.7 is proved and property P6 is veriﬁed. 
PΦϕ ≡
∨[{BΨϕ: Ψ ∈ Levels} − {BΦMϕ}]. (P7)
Lemma A.2.8. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model, ϕ be a formula, Φ ∈ Levels, and Z ∈ {B,D, I} (P from the belief axioms is represented
here by PB), then
(M ,w)  PZIϕ ≡
∨[{ZΨϕ: Ψ ∈ Levels} − {ZΦMϕ}].
Proof. Let us take the case where Φ = A. Take any world w ∈ W . Let us suppose that





From axiom A2, we can infer that
(M ,w)  BΠϕ (where Π ∈ Levels− {D}).
By Deﬁnition 3-3, it follows that this can also be presented as the disjunction of the Π belief levels, therefore
(M ,w)  BAϕ ∨ BU1ϕ ∨ BU2ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BUnϕ ∨ BIϕ ∨ BEϕ ∨ BWnϕ ∨ BWn−1ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ BW1ϕ. (2)
So, it follows from (1) and (2) that
(M ,w)  PBIϕ →
∨[{BΨϕ: Ψ ∈ Levels} − {BΦMϕ}]. (3)
If we supposed (2), we can derive (1) by a similar manner and therefore
(M ,w) 
∨[{BΨϕ: Ψ ∈ Levels} − {BΦMϕ}]→ PBIϕ. (4)
So, from (3) and (4),
(M ,w)  PBIϕ ≡
∨[{BΨϕ: Ψ ∈ Levels} − {BΦMϕ}].
Thus Lemma A.2.8 is proved for the case of Φ = A.
All for the other cases of Φ can be similarly proved without problem. Therefore, Lemma A.2.8 is proved and P7 is
veriﬁed. 
BΦ(ϕ → ψ) → (BAϕ → BΦψ). (A8)
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(M ,w)  ZΦ(ϕ → ψ) → (ZAϕ → ZΦψ).
Proof. Take any world w ∈ W . Let us suppose that
(M ,w)  ZΦ(ϕ → ψ). (1)
We must show that (M ,w)  ZAϕ → ZΦψ . Let us also suppose that
(M ,w)  ZAϕ. (2)
Now we must show (M ,w)  ZΦψ .
By Deﬁnition 3-2, it follows from (1) that∥∥(ϕ → ψ)∥∥ ∈ NZ (w,Φ). (3)
By Deﬁnition 3-2, it follows from (2) that
‖ϕ‖ ∈ NZ (w,A). (4)
By Lemma A.1.3, it follows from (3) that
‖¬ϕ‖ ∪ ‖ψ‖ ∈ NZ (w,Φ). (5)
By Lemma A.1.2, it follows from (5) that,(
W − ‖ϕ‖)∪ ‖ψ‖ ∈ NZ (w,Φ). (6)
By Deﬁnition 5b, it follows from (4) and (6) that,
‖ψ‖ ∈ NZ (w,Φ).
Therefore, by Deﬁnition 3-2,
(M ,w)  ZΦψ.
So, (M ,w)  ZΦ(ϕ → ψ) → (ZAϕ → ZΦψ).
Thus, Lemma A.2.9 is proved and axiom A8 is veriﬁed. 
BΠϕ → PΠϕ
where Π ∈ Levels− {E, I}. (P8)
Lemma A.2.10. Let M = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model, ϕ be a formula, Π ∈ Levels − {E, I}, and Z ∈ {B,D, I} (P from the belief axioms is
represented here by PB), then
(M ,w)  ZΠϕ → PZΠϕ.
Proof. Take any world w ∈ W . Let us suppose that
(M ,w)  ZΠϕ.
By Lemma A.2.2 and Deﬁnition 1.1, it follows that,
(M ,w) ¬ZΠMϕ.
By Lemma A.2.4, it follows that
(M ,w) ¬ZΠ¬ϕ.
By Deﬁnition 1, it follows that
(M ,w) ¬¬PZΠ¬¬ϕ,
which is equivalent to
(M ,w)  PZΠϕ.
Therefore
(M ,w)  ZΠϕ → PZΠϕ.
Thus, Lemma A.2.10 is proved and P8 is veriﬁed. 
BΦϕ → BA BΦϕ. (A9)
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(M ,w)  ZΦϕ → BA ZΦϕ.
Proof. Take any world w ∈ W . Let us suppose that
(M ,w)  ZΦϕ. (1)
By Deﬁnition 3.2, it follows that
‖ϕ‖ ∈ NZ (w,Φ).
By Deﬁnition 5e, it then follows that{











Again, by Deﬁnition 3-2, it follows that
‖ZΦϕ‖ ∈ NB(w,Φ),
and therefore (again by Deﬁnition 3-2),
(M ,w)  BA ZΦϕ. (2)
So it follows from (1) and (2) that
(M ,w)  ZΦϕ → BA ZΦϕ.
Thus Lemma A.2.11 is proved and A9 is veriﬁed. 
PΦϕ → BA PΦϕ. (A10)
Lemma A.2.12. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model, ϕ be a formula, Φ ∈ Levels, and Z ∈ {B,D, I} (P from the belief axioms is represented
here by PB), then
(M ,w)  PZΦϕ → BA PZΦϕ.
Proof. Take any world w ∈ W . Let us suppose that
(M ,w)  PZΦϕ. (1)
By Deﬁnition 1, it follows that
(M ,w) ¬ZΦ¬ϕ.
By Lemma A.2.4 it follows that
(M ,w) ¬ZΦMϕ.












w ′: (M ,w)  ZΦMϕ
} ∈ NB(w,A).
By Deﬁnition 3-3,{
w ′: (M ,w) ¬ZΦMϕ} ∈ NB(w,A).
By Deﬁnition 1 and Lemma A.2.4, it then follows that{
w ′: (M ,w)  PZΦϕ
} ∈ NB(w,A).
So, by Deﬁnition 3-2,
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Therefore, from (1) and (2) it follows that
(M ,w)  PZΦϕ → BA PZΦϕ.
Thus, Lemma A.2.12 is proved and A10 is veriﬁed. 
BA(ϕ → ϕ). (A11)
Lemma A.2.13. LetM = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a model, ϕ be a formula, w ∈ W , and Z ∈ {B,D, I}, then
(M ,w)  ZA(ϕ → ϕ).
Proof. Take any world w ∈ W . Let us examine
(M ,w)  ZA(ϕ → ϕ). (1)
By Deﬁnition 3-2, (1) is true if and only if
‖ϕ → ϕ‖ ∈ NZ (w,A). (2)
By Lemma A.1.6, (2) is true if and only if
W ∈ NZ (w,A). (3)
But, by Deﬁnition 5g, (3) is true, therefore (1) is also true.
Therefore, Lemma A.2.13 is proved, and A11 is veriﬁed. 
Appendix B. Completeness proofs
The proof that the logic characterised by axioms A1–A11 is complete by the class of minimal models satisfying Deﬁni-
tion 5 is a standard proof based on canonical models (see [11] for the basic structure of the proof and standard results).
What we are going to show here is that the conditions given in Deﬁnition 5 correspond to the axioms.
Deﬁnition 1. Let M = 〈W , {NB ,ND ,NI }, V 〉 be a minimal model. M is a canonical model iff:
1. W is the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulae;
2. For Z ∈ {B,D, I}
NZ (w,Φ) =
{ {|ϕ|: ZΦϕ ∈ w} Φ = I,
{|ϕ|: ZΦϕ ∈ w} ∪ {X: ∀ϕ(X = |ϕ|)} Φ = I
where |ϕ| = {w ∈ W : ϕ ∈ w};
3. V (p,w) = true iff p ∈ w , for p ∈ P .
Contrary to what happens for Kripke models we can have multiple minimal canonical models. They can vary from the
smallest minimal model where we have that each neighbourhood is restricted to the case given for Φ = I, to the case
where each neighbourhood is deﬁned as in the case for Φ = I (i.e., when we have the largest minimal model). Notice that
in Deﬁnition 1 the choice of I is arbitrary, all we need is to capture all possible subsets of X and to ensure that they are
distributed over the neighbourhoods for the various level of modalities.
All we have to do to prove completeness is to show that each time an axiom belongs to a possible world (and an axiom
as such belongs to all possible worlds), then the corresponding semantic condition is satisﬁed by the canonical model.
Axiom A1. The condition corresponding to this axiom is condition d) of Deﬁnition 5.
Suppose that condition d) does not hold. This means that there is a set X ⊆ W such that for every Φ ∈ Levels, X /∈
NZ (w,Φ) for some world w . We have two cases, (i) for all formulas ϕ , X = |ϕ| or (ii) X = |ϕ| for some formula ϕ . For
(i) according to the construction of the canonical model, X ∈ NZ (w, I). Contradiction. For (ii), since X /∈ NZ (w,Φ) for all
Φ ∈ Levels, then |ϕ| /∈ NZ (w,Φ), thus ZΦϕ /∈ w . By maximality ¬ZΦϕ ∈ w , for all Φ ∈ Levels, thus ∧Φ∈Levels ¬ZΦϕ ∈ w . But∧
Φ∈Levels ¬ZΦϕ ∈ w ≡ ¬
∨
Φ∈Levels ZΦϕ , and this implies that ¬A1,A1 ∈ w contrary to the consistency of w . Contradiction.
Axiom A2. The condition corresponding to this axiom is condition c) of Deﬁnition 5.
Suppose that the condition does not hold. This means that there is a set of possible worlds X ∈ NZ (w,Φ) ∩ NZ (w,Ψ )
for Φ = Ψ . Since sets of worlds not corresponding to any proof set are only NZ (w, I), we have that X = |ϕ| for some
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get that ⊥ ∈ w , contrary to the consistency of w . Contradiction. Thus NZ (w,Φ) ∩ NZ (w,Ψ ) = {}.
Axiom A3. This axiom corresponds to the inference rule RE which is valid in every minimal model.
Axioms A4, A5, A6 and A7. Axioms A4, A5, A6 and A7, are all instances of the more general axiom
ZΦϕ ≡ ZΦM¬ϕ. (A4–7)
The condition that corresponds to this axiom is condition a) of Deﬁnition 5.
Suppose that we have a set of worlds X in NZ (w,Φ). For Φ = I, by construction, NZ (Φ,w) = {|ϕ|: ZΦϕ ∈ w}, thus
X = |ϕ| for some formula ϕ , such that ZΦϕ ∈ w . From A4–7 we obtain ZΦM¬ϕ ∈ w , and then, by construction of the
canonical model, |¬ϕ| ∈ NZ (w,ΦM), which is W − |ϕ| ∈ NZ (w,ΦM). For Φ = I we have to consider the case where X
does not correspond to any proof set. But this means that also W − X does not correspond to any proof set, otherwise X
would correspond to a proof set. Therefore according to the construction of the canonical model both X and W − X are in
NZ (w, I). However, IM = I. Thus the property holds also in this case.
Axiom A8. The condition corresponding to this axiom is condition b) of Deﬁnition 5.
Suppose ZAϕ ∧ ZΦ(ϕ → ψ) ∈ w . Accordingly, we have ZAϕ ∈ w , ZΦ(ϕ → ψ) ∈ w and by the axiom A8 and the max-
imality of w , ZΦψ ∈ w . From the ﬁrst two we have |ϕ| ∈ NZ (w,A), and |ϕ → ψ | ∈ NZ (w,Φ). The latter is equivalent to
(W − |ϕ|) ∪ |ψ | ∈ NZ (w,Φ), while ZΦψ ∈ w means |ψ | ∈ NZ (w,Φ). Thus condition b) of Deﬁnition 5 is satisﬁed.
Axiom A9. The conditions corresponding to this axiom are conditions e) and g) of Deﬁnition 5.
If X ∈ NZ (w,Φ), for Φ = I, then we have that X = |ϕ| for some formula ϕ . But this means that ZΦϕ ∈ w , and so
BA ZΦϕ ∈ w which, by the construction of the canonical model corresponds to what we want to prove. For I we have
to consider the case that X is not the proof set for any formula ϕ . However, by construction of the canonical model,
{w: X ∈ NZ (w, I)} = W , and W ∈ NB(w,A).
Axiom A10. The conditions corresponding to this axiom are conditions f) and g) of Deﬁnition 5.
If X /∈ NZ (w,Φ), then for Φ = I, this means that X = |ϕ| for some formula ϕ . Therefore ¬ZIϕ ∈ w , and so BA¬ZIϕ ∈ w ,
so |¬ZIϕ| ∈ NB(w,A) which is {w ′: X /∈ NZ (w ′, I)} ∈ NB(w,A).
For Φ = I, in addition to the case above, we have to consider the case where X is not a proof set. But then, by construc-
tion, {w: X /∈ NZ (w,Φ)} = W , and then we have that W ∈ NB(w,A).
Axiom A11. The condition corresponding to this axiom is condition g) of Deﬁnition 5.
ZA(ϕ → ϕ) ∈ w means that |ϕ → ϕ| ∈ NZ (w,A), and |ϕ → ϕ| = W , thus W ∈ NZ (w,A).
Appendix C. Agent veriﬁcation
We shall now verify that the System deﬁned in Deﬁnitions 6 to 8 is consistent with our model as deﬁned in Deﬁnitions 2
and 5. Let M = 〈W ,N, V 〉 be a Model, A = 〈β, δ, ι〉 be an Agent, S = 〈M ,A〉 be a System, Φ,Ψ ∈ Levels, γ ∈ {β, δ, ι},
Z ∈ {B,D, I}, and w ∈ W .
Deﬁnition 7 states that NZ is a set made of subsets of W . This is consistent with the original signature of NZ in
Deﬁnition 2-2.
We will now examine the detailed construction of NZ in the System and Agent in relation to the conditions placed upon
N in Deﬁnition 5. We recall that NZ (w,Φ) is as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 8 and γ is as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 7. Given that
Z ∈ {B,D, I}, let Z ′ = γ .
For some set X ⊆ W and Φ ∈ Levels, let us suppose that
X ∈ NZ (w,Φ)
for some ϕ ∈ L such that X = ‖ϕ‖.
To show consistency with Deﬁnition 5a, we need to prove





Let us examine the case where Φ = A. By Deﬁnition 8a,
Z ′(w, X) = γ (w, X) = 1.
By Deﬁnition 7b, γ (w, X) = 1− γ (w,W − X), therefore
Z ′(w,W − X) = 1− Z ′(w, X) = 0.
272 J. Blee et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 250–273By Deﬁnition 8e then,
W − X ∈ NZ (w,D).
By Deﬁnition 1.1, D is the mirror of A, so (1) holds for Φ = A.
Let us examine the case of Φ = Ui . By Deﬁnition 8b, Z ′(w, X) ∈ Q(Ui), so
Z ′(w, X) =m,
where Q(Ui) is as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 6-2, m ∈ Q, and 0 · 5<m < 1.
By Deﬁnition 7b,
Z ′(x,W − X) = 1− Z ′(w, X) = 1−m.
This aligns with Q(Wi) in Deﬁnition 6-2, so by Deﬁnition 8d,
W − X ∈ NZ (w,Wi).
By Deﬁnition 1.1, Wi is the mirror of Ui , so (1) holds for Φ = Ui . All the other cases can be similarly veriﬁed, so therefore,
we can verify that Deﬁnitions 6 to 8 are consistent with, and 7b is necessary for, Deﬁnition 5a.
We will now examine consistency with Deﬁnition 5b. After reminding ourselves that Z ′ = γ , let us suppose that
X ∈ NZ (w,A) and
(
(W − X) ∪ Y ) ∈ NZ (w,Φ)
for some formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ L such that ‖ϕ‖ = X and ‖ψ‖ = Y .
To show consistency with 5b, we must show that
Y ∈ NZ (w,Φ).
By Deﬁnition 8a
γ (w, X) = Z ′(w, X) = 1.
By Deﬁnition 7c,
γ (w, Y ) = Z ′(w, Y ) = γ (w, (W − X) ∪ Y ).
Since ((W − X) ∪ Y ) ∈ NZ (w,Φ), by Deﬁnition 8, it follows that
Y ∈ NZ (w,Φ).
Thus, we can verify that Deﬁnitions 6 to 8 are consistent with, and Deﬁnition 7c is necessary for, Deﬁnition 5b.
We will now examine consistency with Deﬁnition 5c and 5d. By Deﬁnition 8, the possible value of Z ′(w, X) is in the
range deﬁned by Deﬁnition 6. It can be easily seen by reading Deﬁnition 6 that no γ /Z ′ value assigned to one level could
possibly be assigned to another level. It can be similarly seen that each γ /Z ′ value must be assigned to a level and cannot
be unassigned.
Therefore, we can verify that Deﬁnitions 7 and 8 are consistent with Deﬁnition 5, subparts c and d.
We will now examine the System’s consistency with Deﬁnition 5e. Let us suppose Z ′ = γ and that X ∈ NZ (w,Φ). We
need to therefore show that{




for some formula ϕ ∈ L such that ‖ϕ‖ = X .
Let Z ′(w, X) = q, where q ∈ {x ∈ Q: 0 x 1} ∪ {u}.





w ′ ∈ W : Z ′(w ′, X)≈ q})= 1.














Therefore, we can verify that Deﬁnitions 6 to 8 are consistent with, and Deﬁnition 7d is necessary for, Deﬁnition 5e.
Lemma A.1.5 proves that Deﬁnition 5f is derivable from 5e, therefore, we can verify that Deﬁnitions 6 to 8 are also
consistent with Deﬁnition 5f.
γ (w,W ) = 1 from Deﬁnition 7c and Deﬁnition 8a easily show that the Agent System is consistent with Deﬁnition 5g.
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